Abstract: This study evaluates discontinuity that is induced by the two-stage lawmaking process of EU directives and discussed in the jurisprudential literature as another source for the EU's democratic deficit. While directives must be transposed into national law, their lengthy transposition period has raised the normative question about the extent to which governments of today can politically and reliably commit domestic majorities of tomorrow.
Discontinuity in Two-stage EU Lawmaking
This article investigates a constitutional element of democratic government, namely the temporal restriction of political authority and power, which has been disregarded in the political science literature on the EU's democratic deficit (see for this debate, i.e. Dehousse 1995 , Majone 1998 , Moravcsik 2002 , Follesdahl and Hix 2005 , Rittberger 2005 ). Much of this literature focuses on the distribution of power in EU legislative decision making, in particular whether the European Parliament (EP) is involved or not, but it remains an open question whether and to what extent representatives of today can commit the representatives of tomorrow who can hardly bloc, change or amend the decisions of the former on time (Pernice 2005) . Compared to the provisions in the member states, in which the authority and policy-making activities of elected representatives usually end with dissolution, the end of parliamentary sessions or the conclusion of the legislative term, and in which pending initiatives usually die to prevent discontinuity between the mandate and policy making (see for more detail, Döring 1995: 242) , Commission proposals neither die, nor does EU lawmaking allow for the direct control of the representatives in a temporally limited fashion.
By contrast, in particular the implementation of directives induces a potential for discontinuity by conventionally establishing a two-year transposition period, in which the (newly elected) representatives might be obliged to implement the decision of the former without having a realistic chance to amend or revise it in a timely fashion.
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Although discontinuity normatively poses a legitimacy problem particularly in systems with strong checks-and-balances and high agency loss when the principal -in terms of the directly elected parliamentary representatives of voters -lacks control of the governmental agents and is unable to learn about it, the evaluation of the empirical impact of discontinuity requires the identification of the extent to which governments of today can politically and reliably commit majorities of tomorrow, to which former and current representatives differ in their preferences, and to which these new majorities are able to learn about this process. This empirical examination is the main goal of the following analysis of discontinuity that may point to another possible source for the EU's democratic deficit, which is directly related to the discussion about the involvement of the EP: while moral hazard and adverse selection usually give the (parliamentary) principal incentives to gather information about the (governmental) agent (Lupia 2003: 4) , parliamentary learning is heavily restricted in the two-stage process of EU lawmaking, in which the EP is still incompletely involved, and governmental agents can increase their discretionary power by hiding their preferences in secret Council negotiations and bypassing their domestic parliaments when they implement legislative decisions. This suggests that discontinuity allows expanding power over time, and neither the parliamentary majority nor the voter can find out whether and how the government was unwilling or unable to support the preferences of the principal.
For the empirical analysis of discontinuity, major empirical challenges are to find out whether and to what extent the parliamentary principal can learn ex ante and ex post about the governmental agent's behaviour, and to identify discontinuity problems by changing coalitions and preferences during the implementation process in all member states. For this purpose, this study uses longitudinal information on the transposition history of all directives in 15 member states and the governmental preferences from January 1986 to February 2003, the entry into force of the Nice Treaty. In addition to information on Commission proposals and EP participation, the database includes 1569 directives and their transposition records in the member states.
2 This sample of more than 8000 observations (15 countries times about 1569) shall provide a solid empirical answer to two questions on the amount and extent of i) domestic parliamentary inclusion in EU lawmaking by directives, ii) discontinuity with respect to member state elections as well as changes in government and coalition preferences.
The analysis attempts to answer whether and to what extent EU lawmaking suffers from a parliamentary deficit at the EU and domestic level, and whether and to what extent the EU requires the implementation of directives adopted by a former government, perhaps by another coalition with quite different preferences. In addition to the potential for change via elections, the analysis also specifies whether and how often governmental composition changed in the time between the adoption of the directive and the notification of national transposition measures as reported by the member states. However, since governmental composition can change despite preferences remaining the same, and conversely, governmental composition can remain stable despite changes in preferences, this study proposes the use of party manifestos to identify sector specific and EU related governmental (coalition) preferences.
The remainder introduces the problem of discontinuity, discusses the lack of direct control of governmental agents providing insight into parliamentary involvement in the lawmaking of directives. Furthermore, the conventional domestic rules established to prevent discontinuity are presented for the 15 member states, revealing a large discrepancy between domestic and EU provisions. Finally, discontinuity is empirically examined with respect to electoral events, governmental coalition and preference changes. The findings show that the two-stage process associated with directives not only curtails ex ante and ex post parliamentary control but it also establishes a notable potential for discontinuity. In the time between the adoption of a directive and the specified transposition deadline, elections and governmental change are found in about one third of all cases. More importantly, governmental preferences change within the course of most national transposition processes, even though these changes primarily refer to sector-specific policy making. In some countries, such as Austria, Sweden and France, we find notable preference changes between the government who agreed to Community legislation and the one responsible for implementing it, suggesting a high potential of discontinuity problems.
Democracy and Discontinuity -A Comparative View on Temporal Power
The continuity of representative democracy specifies authority and power temporally.
Compared to inheritance, which ties the hands of newly elected governments by existing legislation and formerly adopted programs (Davis and Rose 1994), this temporal specification is designed to avoid personnel, formal and material discontinuity (Pernice 2005) . In almost all democracies, discontinuity in personnel is conventionally prohibited by displacing the president and the dissolution of parliament, which usually includes all activities and parliamentary committees. Material discontinuity concerns legislative decision making and is usually avoided by settling initiatives at the end of the term, except for those cases not requiring formal adoption (Döring 1995) . In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, this kind of parliamentary supremacy is more of a "gentlemen's agreement with constitutional character," while in countries like Germany, scholars interpret this practice as common law.
These provisions attempt to guarantee the temporal aspect of democracy and are, thus, a fundamental constitutional element of representative democracy in the member states of the EU.
In particular in the normative jurisprudential literature, the central assertion is that discontinuity threatens to violate this principle (Pernice 2005 (Schorn 2000: 43-54) . Belgian bills can survive dissolution or the end of the four year period, if they have already found approval in one of the Houses.
While these formal hurdles exist for national legislation to prevent discontinuity, the EU has established a two-stage lawmaking-process which allows to exclude parliaments and to shift of political accountability over time. The most common example for this two-stage process in the EU is the transposition of directives, which define binding and enforceable guidelines for policy making that have to be implemented by the national legislator within a given (sometimes extensive) period of time (author). From a political science view, the conventional two year-transposition period of EU directives -which may be extended to several years in the event of successive treaty violation procedures or successful member state petition to extend the official deadline -begs the danger of a Jack-in-the-Box-effect.
Although there are several reasons for continued transposition delay, including political, economic or administrative restrictions, the possibility of governmental and/or preference change the question is to which extent does this obligation matter for the newly elected.
In principle, such requirements do not necessarily threaten the legitimacy of a political system because the newly elected government can usually revise or amend the decision of the former. But compared to a few member states, where discontinuity problems may also arise, the EU has established a restrictive voting system which makes revisions and amendments by the newly elected government almost impossible. This system not only requires that the Commission would make an initiative in the sense of the newly elected representative, but the Council must also adopt the proposal by either unanimity or a qualified majority of about 72%
in an enlarging EU, sometimes followed by the necessary support of the EP. This increases the potential of a Jack-in-the-Box-effect, which risks to dilute democratic accountability and legitimisation for political decisions, because parliament and voters are unable to control the policy making of their delegated representatives with their electoral vote -even if the results of the directive are not supported by the current majority, both the government and (sometimes) parliament are obligated to adopt the measures appropriate for implementing the directive and hardly able to initiate amendments or to change this policy.
Compared to the political and scholarly debate on the EU's democratic deficit that has raised attention to the powers of the EP, few insights and -to my knowledge -no empirical study exist on the discontinuity potential induced by the two-stage process of EU directives. promoted nor is informed about the implementation of the formers agent decision, discontinuity will raise agency loss and beg a serious legitimacy problem induced by the (growing) importance of directives.
Discontinuity without Parliamentary Control
The two-stage process of directives formally offers national parliaments ex ante and ex post influence when the legislation is adopted at the EU level and when it is implemented at the This suggests that a significant contribution to the parliamentary deficit in EU legislative decision making is made by the member states themselves. The governments of the member states have a good deal of discretion in deciding about the ex ante inclusion of their own parliament, but most parliaments are excluded from this process and only modestly informed about EU legislative decision making, which induces principal-agent problems from moral hazard (Lupia 1992) . Accordingly, the national parliaments, as directly elected representatives and principals, regularly lack information about the governmental agent's action, thus allowing the agent to choose her own views, including the possibility of adverse selection due to the secret nature of Council negotiations (Brehm and Gates 1997) . As a result, parliamentary ex ante control and influence on the making of directives is very limited, and governments have significant discretionary power with the respective EU negotiations.
A second possibility of parliamentary involvement on EU legislative decision making may exist ex post during the implementation stage of directives, which could offer learning about agent actions from others. While parliamentarians are directly elected, more politically concerned about the interests of the voters and will amend legislation, the executive rather focuses on the technical problems of policy making. For Majone, the EU is a regulatory agency addressing market failures, which produces by definition pareto-efficient outcomes and does not lack democratic foundation but credibility (Majone 1993 (Majone , 2000 . However, since this agency will implement prior (pareto-efficient) legislation even in the event of drastic preference change, the exclusion of parliamentary involvement should increase the risks of discontinuity. In particular in the case of "regulatory" directives, which are adopted by either the Commission, the Council, or, Council and EP, and require transposition into the domestic law of the member states, which is formally monitored by the Commission, this exclusion generates discontinuity problems. According to Article 249, a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each member state to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. If the Commission decides that a member state has failed to fulfil an obligation, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the state concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the state does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice (Article 226), and significant sanctions can be imposed according to Article 228 in the event of further violation.
Member states typically have to notify the implementing measures intended to achieve the results of the directive within a two-year period, even in the case of contradicting national law. Formally, member states cannot justify delay by domestic problems and restrictions, because the supremacy of EU legislation and the obligation to implement directives dominates any national provision even if this provision is a constitutional element (Prechal 1996) . This means that the implementation of directives does not require any additional ratification procedure and forces domestic legislative bodies to act in the interest of the directive's results. Delay or ineffective implementation is not only be punishable by monetary sanctions or provisions for liability, direct applicability also obliges national courts to rule conformably with the directive. Yet, member states differ in their implementation record, and the Commission does not prosecute all infringements (author 2005). Table 2 lists the number of adopted directives and the notification record of each member state. Only in Austria, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, Finland and Germany, do we find parliamentary participation in about half of the implementation cases; the average participation rate is only about 15%. These numbers clearly demonstrate that parliamentary ex post control hardly exists, revealing a large potential for agency loss, in particular when the governmental agent is unwilling or unable to serve the parliamentary principal's interest. Only if the principal were to have complete information about the governmental agent's actions, could agency losses be minimized, but the high share of parliamentary exclusion prohibits acquiring information on EU lawmaking. In the extreme, a "liberal" policy that was contested by the opposition in the national electoral campaign and refused by the voters could be implemented by bureaucratic means without parliamentary knowledge.
Directives: Electoral, Governmental and Preference Change
With regard to the very limited possibilities for parliamentary control, the identification of potential discontinuity in EU lawmaking demands empirical evaluation of the two-stage lawmaking process, which is an ambitious task for 15 countries over time. In general, the twostage nature of this process implies that the results are determined by two developments, i) the amount of directives and number of domestic elections, ii) government and preference change in the member states. A quick inspection of the EU legislative record has already revealed that the number of directives has remained relatively constant over the last twenty years, while the annual number of regulations dramatically decreased from about 500 in the beginning of the 1990s to less than 100 regulations by the beginning of 2000s (see figure 1) . Without consideration of the qualitative nature of EU legislation, this suggests that directives -and thus discontinuity in the implementation process -are becoming relatively more important for the evaluation of EU lawmaking. Looking at the amount of directives and number of domestic elections, 2539 national responses were potentially subject to discontinuity via elections from the total sample of 8382 cases. Particularly in Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Germany and Italy, many cases were subject to elections during the transposition period. On closer inspection, 2145 cases experienced governmental change, a few without elections due to a change of coalition partners during the legislative term. This potential for discontinuity empirically affects almost 30% of all member state transposition efforts. Table 3 shows that there is variation among the member states: due to coalition instability, more than half of the Italian cases and almost one third of the 279 Austrian cases were subject to governmental change, while only 4% of British, 10% of Finnish and 15% of German cases experienced governmental change during the process. Unsurprisingly, the amount of governmental change is lower than the number of elections, but every member state experienced governmental change during the transposition of some directives.
However, as already mentioned, elections and governmental change are rather crude indicators for discontinuity. For example, governments could be re-elected and have similar preferences in the following legislative term, and this would raise little concern about a potential democratic deficit or lack of legitimacy. A more important indicator for discontinuity should be change in governmental preferences that is when the preferences of the former government differ from those of the newly elected government that is responsible for the implementation of the former government's activity. While there exists no indicator for the governmental preferences on each directive, this study proposes using party manifestos for identifying the governmental (coalition) preferences across policy sectors and over time (author). To control for the possibility that a former government might have been outvoted under Council qualified majority voting and preference change from the former to the current government might even include the preferences of the newly elected government in the directive's policy, tables 4 and 5 list the number of national transposition responses related to directives adopted under unanimity in parentheses. These unanimity cases also demonstrate how difficult a change of a decision would be for the following majority with different preferences from the former.
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Using party manifestos for the identification of governmental preferences requires several steps. First, national party manifestos are merged with data on the party composition of the corresponding governments, including the date of their inauguration and dismissal.
Secondly, in order to relate these data to policy areas, party positions are computed for specific EU policy sectors like agricultural, trade and internal market politics. 5 The resulting set of cases was completed with a European integration dimension referring to the pro-and anti-European attitude of political parties (Hix 1999 , Gabel and Hix 2002 , Hooghe et al. 2002 , Pennings 2002 ). This dimension is coded for all proposals in addition to the sector-specific dimension that varies across all directives to incorporate party preference changes in the respective area of agricultural, common rules, energy/ environment or internal market. To estimate governmental coalition positions, the positions of the coalitional parties are averaged.
Independent from other coding possibilities, the main advantage is that these positions vary across policy areas and over time. More specifically, the positions provide information on which sector-specific outcomes are preferred by governments over time, while the EU dimension should cover whether a government favors policy making at the domestic or EU level.
Looking at the two-stage process and preference change, Finally, tables 5a and 5b show governmental preference change on whether national legislative competences should (in general) be delegated to the EU level. With reference to table 4a, the number of cases with maximum change is slightly lower than the number of cases with sector-specific change, and moderate preference change exists more often with respect to EU affairs. Interestingly, we find more maximum and moderate changes in favour of EU integration than against it. This also holds true for cases under unanimity. Applied to the member states, Austria, France and Sweden are the outliers with maximum changes, followed by Denmark. Some countries, such as the Netherlands or Finland almost lack cases of transposition exposed to maximum governmental preference change in European affairs.
Discontinuity and Change: Another source for the EU's democratic deficit?
Before examining parliamentary deficit and discontinuity of EU lawmaking in the member states over a period of more than 15 years, it has been shown that continuity is a central feature of democratic government in all member states, in which political authority and power are temporally limited. Voters assign authority and policy-making power to representatives for a limited period, and in almost all member states, the authority and policy-making activities of the representatives formally end with parliamentary dissolution or the end of legislative terms; thus, pending initiatives usually expire to prevent discontinuity between the political mandate and policy making. Moreover, the newly elected representatives may more easily change the decisions of the former, because domestic voting systems are less restrictive and allow the newly elected majority to initiate, amend and adopt their programmatic issues.
In contrast to the member states, the voting system of the EU hardly allows for policy change and the two-stage process of EU lawmaking induces a high potential of discontinuity between the governmental representatives who adopt directives and those (newly elected) governments that are obliged to implement the decisions of their predecessors. The findings on over 15 years of national transposition confirm that the EU carries this risk of discontinuity. In almost one third of all cases, election and governmental change occur during the time lag between adoption and transposition. Moreover, a similar number of cases documents that the preferences between the previous adopting and the subsequent implementing government sometimes change drastically, but EU lawmaking obliges the successor to implement policies supported by the former government. While it could be argued that a former government has been outvoted under qualified majority voting and perhaps pursued the "wrong" interests of the following majority, this result is controlled for the fact that such drastic changes also occur under unanimity rule. In particular in Austria and Sweden, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, Greece, France, and the Netherlands, the following government had to implement sector-specific decisions that were supported by a former government with very different preferences. In these countries, public support for European integration has also decreased in recent years.
Under these conditions and with respect to the increasingly restrictive voting system of the EU as well as the growing importance of directives, discontinuity seems to pose a considerable problem for the accountability and legitimacy of EU lawmaking. On closer inspection of the policy domains, we find that discontinuity hits the internal market domain particularly hard, where most drastic preference changes occur, followed by Common rules.
In these domains, there is a large gap between the actors deciding on policies and those who are forced to bear the responsibility in the implementation process. At the same time, governments prefer to exclude their parliaments and most frequently use executive instruments to transpose directives. Insofar, discontinuity may not only pose another source for the democratic deficit of EU lawmaking, but it also contributes to its increasing bureaucratic nature. Constitution: Article 27(1): "Die Gesetzgebungsperiode des Nationalrates dauert vier Jahre, vom Tag seines ersten Zusammentrittes an gerechnet, jedenfalls aber bis zu dem Tag, an dem der neue Nationalrat zusammentritt." Art. 28 (4): "Bei Eröffnung einer neuen Tagung des Nationalrates innerhalb der gleichen Gesetzgebungsperiode werden die Arbeiten nach dem Stand fortgesetzt, in dem sie sich bei der Beendigung der letzten Tagung befunden haben." (RP: §46 (4) Not explicitly regulated in either the constitution or the RP except under "coutume constante" (circumstances remaining constant): "En vertu d'une coutume constante, l'Assemblée nationale nouvellement élue, n'est plus saisie des textes qui se trouvaient en instance devant l'Assemblée précedente" The Assemblé nationale is bound by D at end of LP, but may be considered in new LP if the Senat passes the bill without further amendment. 6 For the Sénat, bills are differentiated as Projets de loi (Government bills) and Propositions de loi (Parliament bills) where Projets de loi: are not generally subject to discontinuity, and expire only after a change in government (Schorn 2000: 53 RP: "Lapsed Bills: §122.
(1) Any Bill which lapses by reason of a general election for the Seanad may be proceeded with after the general election at the stage it had reached prior to the general election upon a Resolution restoring it to the Order Paper.
(2) Unless the Resolution restoring the Bill to the Order Paper directs otherwise, the Bill shall be proceeded with at the commencement of the particular stage which it had reached prior to the general election." House may, if it declares such bill to be urgent and at the request of the Government or of a Group Chairperson, set a time limit of fifteen days for the Committee to report. 2. Once this time is up, the President shall enter the bill in the agenda of the House or of the Committee acting in a legislating capacity, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Rule 25. 3. In the same six-month period from the beginning of the new Parliament, each Committee may decide, subject to a brief preliminary consideration, to report to the House on any bills approved by the same Committee in a reporting capacity during the previous Parliament, and to adopt the report presented at that time. 4. For bills initiated by citizens, the procedure envisaged in paragraph 1 for introduction shall not be necessary. When such bills have been approved by the Chamber in the previous Parliament or have been considered in full at the Committee stage, if the Government or a Group Chairperson so requests, the provisions set out in the preceding paragraphs shall apply; otherwise the bill shall be referred again to the appropriate Committee according to subject matter, following ordinary procedures." 13 RP (official English Translation): "Rule 81: Bills already passed or considered in the previous Parliament: 1.In the case of bills introduced in the first six months of a new Parliament which are identical to the text of bills approved only by the Senate in the previous Parliament, the government or twenty Senators may, within one month of their introduction, a move that they be declared 80 bills and that summary proceedings may be adopted as provided in the following paragraphs. (...) 3.Should the Senate resolve that the bill is urgent and adopts the summary proceedings, if the bill is referred to a committee sitting in a reporting capacity it shall be authorised to report orally to the Senate, and the bill shall be automatically set down in the calendar or the Work Plan immediately following the current one so that the Senate can vote on it, with the speakers restricted to the rapporteur, the representative of the government and the sponsors of any amendments, and the explanations of vote provided by Rule 109(2) shall be permitted. (...) 5.standing committees to which bills are referred in a reporting capacity which identical to bills which had been fully considered by the same committees in the previous Parliament may resolve, within the first seven months from the beginning of the new Parliament, and after a after summary consideration thereof, to adopt the reports submitted in the previous Parliament without further debate." 14
Addendum:
The law "Legge La Pergola" (Nr. 86/1989) is of particular importance with reference to Community legislation and in connection with discontinuity because it quickly resolved the related legislative backlog (according to Chiti in Schwarze 1996: 254 ; the legal text is available online in Italian)
